A one-day international conference
The conference
Interest in approaches to ethics which present alternatives to principle-based theories has been growing, and so has interest in Iris Murdoch’s philosophy. This workshop aims to bring these developments together by focusing on what Iris Murdoch has to offer in understanding moral perception.
The idea of ‘moral vision’ is prominent in Murdoch’s philosophy. It is articulated through vocabulary such as ‘really seeing’, ‘looking’, ‘attending’, ‘loving gaze’, and so on. The significance of these words has been disputed by commentators, both in terms of their metaphorical aspect and in terms of their broader implications for Murdoch’s overall conception of morality.
We seek to explore the import of this perceptual vocabulary and draw out Murdoch’s view of moral perception, both in the context of her work and in relation to competing accounts of moral perception (such as the suggestion that moral perception consists in unconscious inference and principle application) and theories of moral intuition.
This will be an opportunity to explore further the work of a philosopher who still, and perhaps more than ever, has much to offer us, and who cannot quite be assimilated into either analytical or continental mainstream discussions of morality generally, or of moral perception particularly.
Questions to be addressed in the workshop include, but are not limited to:
The idea of ‘moral vision’ is prominent in Murdoch’s philosophy. It is articulated through vocabulary such as ‘really seeing’, ‘looking’, ‘attending’, ‘loving gaze’, and so on. The significance of these words has been disputed by commentators, both in terms of their metaphorical aspect and in terms of their broader implications for Murdoch’s overall conception of morality.
We seek to explore the import of this perceptual vocabulary and draw out Murdoch’s view of moral perception, both in the context of her work and in relation to competing accounts of moral perception (such as the suggestion that moral perception consists in unconscious inference and principle application) and theories of moral intuition.
This will be an opportunity to explore further the work of a philosopher who still, and perhaps more than ever, has much to offer us, and who cannot quite be assimilated into either analytical or continental mainstream discussions of morality generally, or of moral perception particularly.
Questions to be addressed in the workshop include, but are not limited to:
- How exactly does Murdoch articulate perception as a form of moral understanding? Is anything missing from her account?
- Based on Murdoch’s framework, how do moral properties relate to empirical properties in perception? Or is this very distinction misleading?
- Does Murdoch indicate an idea of ‘good vision’ or ‘vision of the Good’, or both inextricably?
- What does Murdoch inherit from Plato and/or Aristotle, and where does she depart from them, in her idea of moral perception?
- Is ‘vision’ to be understood as a metaphor only? Or do we need a particular account of vision which is neither metaphorical nor literal? Also, how does vision relate to the other senses?
- How is moral perception linked to moral realism in Murdoch?
- What is the role of attention in moral perception – is it necessary, sufficient, or both?
- How does Murdoch’s account of moral perception relate to more recent work on the topic?
RegisterThere are a small number of bursaries available to defray accommodation and registration (but not travel) costs for graduate students coming from outside Oxford. If you would like to apply for a bursary, please contact us at either ben.sorgiovanni@queens.ox.ac.uk or S.Panizza@uea.ac.uk
For all other delegates, there is a £10 registration fee (including tea/coffee and cake): please click the button on the right |
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